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ON SAYING WHAT YOU MEAN 
WITHOUT MEANING WHAT YOU SAY1
Anne Cutler 
University of Texas at Austin
"Then you should say what you mean", the March Hare went on.
"I doM, Alice hastily replied; "at least - at least I mean
what I say - that’s the same thing, you know".
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter.
- Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
If Harryfs boss says of him:
(1) Harry’s a real genius
he may mean what he says; in that case he will probably say it in 
a tone of reverence and admiration. But he may on the other hand 
mean, and wish to say, quite the opposite, that Harry is anything 
but a genius; in this case he can still utter the words of (1), 
but he will express his meaning by superimposing a certain inton­
ation contour which signals to his hearers that the utterance is 
intended to be ironic. It is with such utterances that this paper 
deals: utterances produced in such a way that they express a con­
veyed meaning which is the converse of the literal meaning.
The main concern of the paper is with the characteristics 
and distribution of ironically uttered sentences. It is not inten­
ded, for example, to investigate the details of the rules which 
apply to produce such cases, or at what point in a derivation 
they may apply. Nor will we be concerned with the specific supra- 
segmental correlates of irony. In fact, there are no invariable 
correlates; if cues from the context are strong enough, no inton- 
ational cues are necessary at all. When two people walk into an 
empty bar, for example, the utterance
(2) Sure is lively here tonight
will be understood as ironic regardless of the intonation used.
At other times sentences spoken ironically may be identified as 
such in one or more of the following ways: (a) the entire sen­
tence or part of it may be nasalised; (b) the rate of speaking 
may be slowed; (c) exaggerated stress may be applied to one or 
more words - particularly, stressed syllables may be lengthened 
in an exaggerated fashion.2 Yet again, it is possible in certain 
dialects of English to achieve the same effect by appending the 
words "I don’t think" (with heavy stress on don’t) to a sentence 
uttered with ironic intent. Additional intonational cues are op­
tional. Thus (3) conveys the same meaning as the ironic reading 
of (1):
(3) Harry’s a real genius, I don’t think
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(A brief digression will be made here to deal with the 
problem of writing about a phenomenon which has no conventional 
written representation. In identifying the ironically uttered 
examples in this paper, no attempt will be made to represent the 
suprasegmental cues to irony, if any, in each case; instead, a 
purely arbitrary convention will be adopted. From this point on, 
an example or part of an example presented in tJnib t y p z ^ a c d  shall 
be taken to represent words spoken with ironic intent, and bear­
ing a conveyed meaning at variance with the literal meaning. Thus 
a starred example identified by typeface as ironic will represent 
a sentence spoken with appropriate ironic intonation - it is al­
ways possible to speak a sentence in any given manner - but with­
out that intonation producing a conveyed meaning at odds with the 
literal meaning, i.e. with no ironic effect.)
To be uttered ironically, i.e. to accept a conveyed meaning 
which is the reverse of its literal meaning, a sentence must con­
form to the following restriction: it must, in the context in 
which it is produced, express on its literal reading a desirable 
state of affairs; the literal reading must be approbatory in tone. 
Thus its ironical reading must, obviously, express the converse - 
disapprobation.
It is easy to produce seeming exceptions to this generalis­
ation. What are we to make, for example, of (4), with its con- - 
veyed meaning that Harry is not a sucker at all?
(4) H aAAy’A a  h.<¿aJL ¿ u c k e A
It seems perfectly acceptable as an ironic utterance, and easily 
interpretable: the speaker and his audience, intending perhaps to 
defraud Harry, have discovered to their dismay that Harry is not 
as gullible as they had hoped. In uttering the sentence ironical­
ly, the speaker is taking his audience to task for having previ­
ously held Harry to be a real sucker.
The term "sucker" can hardly be said to be approbatory, so 
this sentence would seem to be an exception to the above restric­
tion. But in fact it is not an exception at all. From the point 
of view of the hypothesised speaker and his audience, for Harry 
to be a sucker would be an immensely desirable state of affairs. 
The literal reading of the sentence can therefore be said to be 
approbatory with respect to the context given.
Further, (4) is only one of a very large class of such 
ironic utterances which consist in the speaker's repeating back 
to his audience something which the audience has previously held, 
or said:
(5) SuAe, Joe, y o u  t o c k e d  th e , doon.
(6) At tfLOÁt ÁX won’t  fujuin, h<¿ 4cuja
(7) Tfid copó w o n ' t  g tv e ,  uó a n y  tA o u b te . ,  H a w iy ’t t  
h a n d le , t h m
As the ironic tone indicates, in each case things have turned 
out otherwise.
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The examples so far given illustrate that there are two 
clear categories into which ironic utterances fall; or, two dis­
tinct types of context in which they can be used. In one category 
is spontaneous irony, in which the speaker is expressing Mwhat he 
means" with no reference to previous context or conversation; (1) 
is a possible member of this category. The other category may be 
called provoked irony - the speaker repeats back to his audience 
something which the audience has previously said or held, with 
the ironic intonation indicating that the previous claim has 
turned out to be wrong. (5)—(7) can only be examples of pro­
voked irony.
The distinction between spontaneous and provoked irony is 
important for the following reason: although any ironic utterance 
can be a member of the category provoked irony given the approp­
riate preceding context ((1), for example, given an audience that 
had previously claimed in all seriousness that Harry was a real 
genius), the category of spontaneous irony is severely limited 
with respect to the semantic characteristics of utterances be­
longing to it - namely, they must be approbatory in character 
on the literal reading.
(Given a sentence with a literal reading which is not appro­
batory, therefore, a successfully imposed ironic intonation has 
the effect of carrying a presupposition with respect to prior 
context - namely, that it has previously been held that this 
literal reading represented reality.)
The approbation condition, as originally stated above, held 
that a sentence can be uttered ironically if it expresses on its 
literal reading a desirable state of affairs in the context in 
which it is produced. In this form the condition actually holds 
also for the category of provoked irony. The desirability of the 
state of affairs expressed in the literal reading of (4), in the 
context in which it is presumed to have been uttered, has already 
been discussed. Similarly, inspection of (5)-(7) reveals that 
they, too, satisfy the condition - the only imaginable contexts 
in which they could occur are those in which the locking of the 
door (or: Joe having told the truth about locking the door), fair 
weather, and the cops not giving any trouble represent in each 
case a desirable state of affairs from the point of view of the 
speaker and/or his audience.
In cases of provoked irony where the literal reading of the 
ironic utterance must be presumed to have been desirable less 
from the point of view of the speaker than from that of his aud­
ience, it is doubtful whether "irony" is any longer an appropriate 
term; (8), for example, is more of a sarcastic taunt:
(8) Voa'd be pnomotdd me, huh?
Terminology, however, is not the point at issue here; the effect 
of the superimposed intonation on the relation of literal to con­
veyed meaning is the same as in earlier examples. Similarly, it
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is more of a taunt to repeat back to a person (using the intona­
tion we call ironic) an utterance of his which you, the speaker, 
believe to have been insincere or a lie:
(9) A: How do you feel about Harry?
B: Can’t stand him.
A: O k, AuAd, you c a n ' t  ¿ ta n d  Hawiy.
In this case, and in others of this sort, it is perhaps 
difficult to see in what sense the state of affairs represented 
in B’s utterance is desirable from the point of view of either A 
or B. It is of course in B’s interest that A believe it to be a 
true statement. However, it is also in a general sense desirable 
that it be true from the point of view of both of them, since it 
is always desirable that the maxims of conversational behavior be 
adhered to in any conversation; included in these is that each 
speaker be sincere. Apparently, then, it is possible to satisfy 
the desirability condition at one remove; if a previous speaker 
has been insincere, i.e. by definition an undesirable state of 
affairs has proved to obtain - or even if the current speaker 
merely believes such to be the case; after all, it is possible 
that B really can’t stand Harry - then the application of ironic 
intonation to a repetition of the insincere utterance is an ac- * 
ceptable way of remonstrating with the participant who has 
offended.3
The category of provoked irony, then, is very large: any­
thing previously said or implied which has since been demonstra­
ted to be false, or which is believed by the current speaker to 
have been untrue or insincere, may be echoed back with a success­
fully applied ironic intonation. It is obvious, though, that 
there are certain types of statement which cannot turn out to be 
false, and which cannot be uttered insincerely - truisms, for 
example, and tautologies. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
thay also cannot accept irony:
(10) *A bacheZoA ¿6 an uwnaAAtzd man
(11) *Tcoo and tw o make fiouA
Similarly, sentences which do not by themselves lead us to 
expect that their literal reading is in any way unchangeable can­
not accept irony when embedded in a context in which their truth 
is presupposed, for instance as the complement of a factive verb. 
Thus while (12) is acceptable, (13) is not, although it might be 
expected to have the same force as (14):
(12) kubtJji ¿6 a ¿wZngtng town
(13) AzgA&tA t h a t  A u sten  a sw in g in g  town
(14) Bill regrets that Austin is a boring town 
The distinction drawn by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) between
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factive and non-factive predicates is supported by the finding 
that non-factive verbs will accept an ironic reading of their 
sentential complements.^ (15) and (16) are equivalent to (17) 
and (18) respectively:
(15) f t l t t  faound o u t  A u s t i n  u xu  a  s t e a l  ¿ w i n g i n '  to w n
(16) B l l i  t h i n i i b  L u b b o c k  f i c a l t y  ¿colngA
(17) Bill found out Austin was a real boring town
(18) Bill thinks Lubbock is really boring
Note, however, that it is not the mere presence of a pre­
supposition which precludes an ironic reading of (13). (19) and 
(20), for example, presuppose (21) and (22) respectively:
(19) Hoaaij'a a c t in g  fiojxl b r i g h t  a g a in
(20) Harry's stopped giving those w i l d ,  faun parties
(21) HaAAy ka6 a c tc d  f ic a l  b r i g h t (i.e. dumb) before
(22) Harry used to give w i l d ,  faun (i.e. dull) parties
The ambiguity of (20) - between Harry having stopped giving 
parties, and Harry having stopped giving the kind of parties he 
used to, though he still gives parties - while it is independent 
of the occurrence of irony, may serve here to illustrate the 
point that a speaker may apply irony to any predicate singly, 
without necessarily affecting the rest of the sentence. In sen­
tences consisting of a simple subject-predicate relation, such as 
(1) and (12), the effect of the irony is global; in (20), however, 
it is clearly a local effect - the ironic conveyed meaning rever­
ses only the literal meaning of the underlying constituent "the 
parties are wild, fun". In what follows, particularly in the dis­
cussion of the scope of the ironic effect in complex sentences, 
the treatment will be confined for the sake of simplicity (and 
economy of space) to "global" irony. In some cases in which it 
will be asserted that global irony is clearly unacceptable, a 
sentence with irony applied locally to one underlying constituent 
may be acceptable. This is, for example, true of questions. While 
it is in general the case that simple questions (as opposed to 
tag questions such as (8) which do not in fact carry the effect 
of questions at all) cannot accept an ironic reading:
(23) *1-6 HaAAij a f ic a l  gcnljuA?
it is nonetheless possible to achieve a local ironic effect in a 
question:
(24) Has Harry stopped giving those w i l d ,  faun parties?
The reader is invited to test this generalisation on later cases 
in which global irony is said to be unacceptable.
Like simple questions, the antecedents of conditionals have 
in themselves no truth value; it is possibly for this reason that
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they, too, cannot be produced with ironic effect:
(25) *Tfa thÂA U> a AcaZ ¿cotngtng to o n , we won't stay
here
The typical ironic utterance would thus far seem to be a 
simple declarative. Whether it expresses an affirmative or a 
negative proposition is immaterial:
(26) I j u s t  love, Han/itj, ¿>uac
(27) 1 d o n ' t  cUa LUic  HaAAy, ok no
as long as the literal reading (given that we are dealing with a 
member of the category of spontaneous irony) is approbatory.
There is one further restriction, a consequence of the ap­
probation condition. This condition may sometimes be fulfilled by 
presupposition, as in (28):
(28) Voua faAtcnd c & c tc L in ty  f a m t n i n c
where it is presupposed that femininity is a desirable trait in 
the context. Presumably one pole of the approbation-dérogation 
continuum has in this case been set equal to feminine, the other' 
to masculine, on the masculine-feminine continuum, which like 
approbation-dérogation is a scalable dimension. What if, however, 
a predicate involves no scalable dimension? Interestingly, an 
ironic reading is in that case unacceptable; compare (28) with
(29)-(31), i.e. the gradable polarity masculine-feminine with its 
discrete counterpart male-female:
(29) Tkcut 4uAe ¿6 a maAcuLinc canaAy
(30) * y  ouA faAicnd ¿6 c e A ta tn ty  fa m a te ,
(31) *T kat ¿uAo, ¿6 a male, canaAt/5
Obviously, an ironic utterance from the class of provoked irony 
can involve a non-gradable predicate:
(32) T k a t ¿uAe ¿6 a a cd cocut you 'A c cvccuUng
would be acceptable in a context where the hearer had promised to 
wear a red coat but had in fact turned up wearing a coat of a dif­
ferent color. More interesting, though, are apparent violations 
of the gradability restriction which are members of the class of 
spontaneous irony and which turn out to satisfy the condition by 
presupposition :
(33) T k a t a u a c  a c o a  y o u 'v e  g o t  th cA c
(34) S u A te ’A a n o th e r  Jayne Manifateid
Such utterances clearly presuppose a gradable dimension. Thus (33)
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on its literal reading is a comment about a good (fast, beautiful 
or otherwise desirable) car, while (34) surely makes use of an un 
spoken dimension of bust size. This group of sentences is co­
extensive with the class which can be spoken with an appreciative 
tone giving just such an expanded approbatory meaning.
Although simple declaratives comprise perhaps a majority of 
ironic expressions, irony can also occur in complex sentences.
The question of the scope of its effect - the production of a 
conveyed meaning which is the reverse of the literal meaning - in 
complex sentences reveals some interesting findings. (In the foil 
owing discussion, for purposes of simplification and thus space- 
saving, irony shall be taken to refer to spontaneous irony. Most 
of the examples given will be acceptable as provoked irony given 
an appropriate context.)
We have already seen that the literal meaning of the ante­
cedent of a conditional cannot be reversed ironically. If, then, 
ironic intonation is applied to a conditional, it may be assumed 
that only the consequent will be able to bear a conveyed meaning 
the reverse of the literal meaning. This is in fact so, regard­
less of the extension of the ironic intonation over the sentence. 
Thus, (35) and (36) have the same force with the intonation ex­
tended over antecedent and consequent as they would have were it 
applied to the consequent alone; the scope of the ironic effect 
is confined to the consequent.
(35) I fa Hojuilj d id  thcut, ke m ust be a Ae,aZ genhxA
(36) I fa the, 4 ecAeXaAy a d m it6 ¿he, eAaAe.d the. tape, on 
puJipo&e, the,n keA bo6t> w lL t  ¿uAe, be. happy
It will be seen that in any complex sentence of which one 
part is an acceptable candidate for irony (in the sense that the 
restrictions described above are met) while the remainder is not, 
the scope of the alteration of meaning effect will be restricted 
to the segment which accepts it irrespective of how much of the 
sentence bears the ironic intonation. Thus in (37):
(37) Ha/uiy'& a Ae.at ge.yuiti> t o  have, g o t  u6 ¿yvto th ib
the scope of the irony is restricted to the predication on Harry 
whether that alone or the entire sentence is spoken ironically.'
Where there is more than one part of a sentence which could 
accept an ironic reading, it will presumably be impossible to 
shift or extend the range of application of the ironic intonation 
without affecting the scope of the ironic effect. (38) and (39) 
show that this is indeed so:
(38) HaAAy'* the. Boy MondeA and B i X J L ' a AeaZ gen/MA
(39) L ith eA  HaAAy'b been A z a t  bAiglvt oa S u A le ’A had 
anotheA ofa keA c A e a t iv e  bAainwaveA
V 2 h
Both sentential segments of each of (38) and (39) bear an ironic­
ally reversed meaning.
Further inspection of (38) reveals another interesting 
effect of irony in complex sentences. If only one conjunct - 
either one - is uttered in the ironic manner the sentence be­
comes unacceptable (though acceptable if the and is replaced by 
but). The relationship of commonality which is required if two 
sentences are to be conjoined (Lakoff 1971) may be satisfied or 
destroyed by an ironic effect. When the conjunction involves 
symmetric and, as in (38) , the commonality relationship is merely 
a fairly loose one involving some common topic. The common topic 
of (38) , that of superior performance on the literal reading and 
inferior performance where both conjuncts are spoken ironically, 
is destroyed if only one conjunct bears the irony.
In sentences conjoined with symmetric and there is relative 
freedom in the application of irony. As in (35) — (37) , if one con­
junct is unacceptable as an ironic utterance the scope of the 
irony will be restricted to the other conjunct, regardless of how 
far the intonation is extended:
(40) Au a t i n  LL qa on  t h e  C o lo tiado  R lv e A  an d  I t 1¿ a 
f i e a L ty  ¿ w in g in g  to w n
#
If the scope of the irony is restricted to the first conjunct the 
second conjunct may elaborate upon it:
(41) HaAMj'A cl tie&L g e n lu A and so is his brother
(42) Aula t i n ' A  cl s ie a lZ y  ¿ w in g in g  to w n and you can
say the same for Lubbock
- it is clear that what is said for (?) Lubbock in (42) is not 
the literal but the conveyed meaning of the first conjunct.
As Lakoff noted, the common topic can be established in con­
joined sentences via presupposition. It is possible for the pre­
supposition to be satisfied in such a case by an ironic - convey­
ed - meaning rather than the literal meaning of one of the con- 
j uncts:
(43) A u A t l n ^  a s ie a L ty  ¿ w in g in g  to w n and I wouldn't
want to live in Lubbock either
Similarly, where the common topic of a sentence conjoined 
with but can be established by presupposition, the presupposition 
can be satisfied by the ironic reading:
(44) A u A t l n ’A a. f i e a t i y  ¿ w in g in g  to w n , but you might
enjoy San Antonio
Given that irony can only be applied to approbatory com­
ments to yield a derogatory effect, and that the necessary rela­
tion between but-conjuncts is one of dissimilarity, it is apparent
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that a but-conjoined sentence in which irony was to be applied to 
one conjunct would require the other conjunct to be approbatory 
in meaning in order for the relation of dissimilarity to hold 
once the irony was applied. Thus both the conjuncts would be on 
their literal readjig approbatory in meaning and in the sentence 
as a whole on its literal reading no relation of dissimilarity 
would hold, i.e. the sentence would be anomalous. The same is the 
case with sentences conjoined with asymmetric and, in which the 
relation between the conjuncts is one of cause and effect; if the 
cause-effect relation holds between the literal reading of one 
conjunct and the ironic reading of the other, it cannot hold be­
tween the literal readings of both conjuncts, and the sentence as 
a whole would be on its literal interpretation anomalous.
As a general rude, such sentences are also unacceptable 
with the ironic intonation imposed; if the literal reading is 
impermissible, it cannot be manipulated to yield a permissible 
interpretation involving irony. Thus (45) , (47) , (49) and (51) 
are unacceptable, although it might have been expected that the 
message they would convey would have been that of (46) , (48) , (50) 
and (52) respectively:
(45) *GdOKQQ, I k  CL g e n lu A and heTll never pass the exam
(46) George is a blockhead and he'll never pass the 
exam
(47) * Everyone left Austin an d  I t  tu A n e d  I n t o  a  fi&ciLty
¿ w in g in g  to w n
(48) Everyone left Austin and it turned into a really 
boring town
(49) San Antonio is a swinging town but K ilktJjn  I k
vQAy LLvdtij
(50) San Antonio is a swinging town but Austin is dull
(51) *George is rich but he,'A  a  H.daJL g e n ia k
(52) George is rich but he's a blockhead
While this generalisation holds for asymmetric-and sentences 
whether the irony is applied to the first or second conjunct, in 
the one case where it is applied to the first conjunct of a but- 
conjoined sentence the irony works despite the anomaly of the 
sentence's literal reading:
(53) Au A t l n  I k  a  ¿ w in g in g  to w n but San Antonio is 
lively
(54) GeoKge I k  a  g e n lu k but he's rich
It is not immediately apparent why this case should be an excep­
tion to the rule.
Obviously, this brief discussion of the characteristics of 
ironic utterances has left many questions unanswered; a large num­
ber of interesting phenomena no doubt remain to be discovered. One 
of the obvious questions must be: is irony a unique phenomenon, or
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are there other intonational manipulations possible which will 
produce a conveyed meaning the reverse of or otherwise at vari­
ance with the literal meaning of a sentence? The "doubting" in­
tonation springs to mind, by which such an utterance as (55):
(55) It's not bad
- uttered with a falling-rising pitch on the final word - can be 
made to convey the meaning that "it" is in the opinion of the 
speaker not at all good. Are there more?
FOOTNOTES
1. I am deeply indebted to Lauri Karttunen for continued en­
couragement and critical appreciation of this paper.
2. In addition, the speaker will probably adopt a facial expres­
sion which may take various forms, from quizzical to sneering. 
The fact that this is an almost invariable correlate does not, 
however, interfere with utterances spoken with the intonation 
described being understood as ironic on the telephone.
3. Grice (19 68) has used irony as an example of a conversational 
implicature being achieved by the deliberate flouting of the . 
conversational maxim "Do not say what you believe to be false". 
On his account it is required that both speaker and audience 
know that the speaker believes what he says to be false, and 
Grice assumes that the context makes this clear. As we have 
seen, however, it is also possible to signal by means of in­
tonational cues that one is saying something one believes to 
be false. In the particular instance of the exchange in (9), 
this device is taken even further - speaker A uses the irony 
signal in repeating back B's words, thus indicating that he 
believes that B has uttered a falsehood.
4. Questions of the scope of irony and the extension of ironic 
intonation in complex sentences will be dealt with below.
5. An effort has been made here to avoid examples which might 
compromise the purity of the gradability restriction - for 
instance, those incorporating proper names ("John sure is 
male" is a tautology, because "John" is a name usually given 
only to male persons; thus it is hardly fair to compare it 
with "John sure is masculine"), or those in which the non- 
gradable version is unacceptable on grammatical grounds even 
on its literal reading ("X sure acts feminine" versus "*X sure 
acts female"; "Y is just so-o-o feminine" etc.). I am grateful 
to Don Foss for the canary.
6. In dialects which accept it, "I don't think" has an effect 
identical with that of ironic tone; "That's a car you've got 
there, I don't think", and "Susie's another Jayne Mansfield,
I don't think" are equivalent to (33) and (34) respectively.
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In all cases so far discussed the behavior of "I don't think" 
is identical to that of ironic intonation.
7. The limitations of the scope become even clearer when the 
corresponding sentences with "I don't think" are considered.
(37a) Harry's a real genius, I don't think, to have
got us into this 
(37b) Harry's a real genius to have got us into this,
I don't think
The extraposition of "I don't think" in (37b), analogous to 
extending ironic intonation over the whole sentence in (37), 
does not alter the scope of the ironic effect.
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